America's best days are still ahead
An election post-mortem: I was wrong about who would win. But I stand by my optimistic outlook for America.
I originally wrote a draft of this post last week, the day after the election. But I decided to hold onto it until I could get my two climate-change-related election posts out first, which I thought were more time-sensitive. If some of what I say here seems dated when this comes out, that’s why.
Last Tuesday morning, before the votes were in, I wrote a long post arguing that polarization will continue declining in the long run, regardless of who won the election. I also predicted in passing—parenthetically, and with admittedly low confidence—that Harris would win. I was wrong about Harris winning, but I remain bullish on America. I also remain bullish on a future of decreasing polarization in the long run, despite a probable increase in polarization in the short run, as people digest the results of a very divisive election.
Why I got the outcome wrong
The polling averages had it as a 50:50 tossup the night before the election. If the polling error was like 2016 or 2020, Trump would sweep the swing states. If the polling error was like 2022, Harris would sweep the swing states. Most prediction markets had it at a roughly 2:1 chance of Trump, probably due to Trump’s polling momentum in the last week or so, plus the 2016 and 2020 polling errors.
My guess was that Harris had a roughly 2:1 chance of winning, thinking (wrongly, it turns out) that 2022 would better predict the polling misses than 2020. In 2022, the Democrats over-performed, and Trump-backed candidates who endorsed his lies about the 2020 election under-performed, compared to the polls. Between 2022 and now, inflation, crime, and illegal border crossings had all fallen, and post-2020 far-left excesses had started noticeably losing power. All of this should have made conditions better for Harris, I thought.
Some Trump-backed extreme candidates, like Kari Lake in Arizona, do seem to be under-performing again (she is behind, but the race has not yet been called). Moderate Democrats Tammy Baldwin, Elissa Slotkin, and Jacky Rosen survived the red wave in swing states Wisconsin, Michigan, and Nevada, respectively, despite Trump winning these sates. It’s worth noting that all three of these women won races against men, given headlines speculating a role of sexism in Harris’ defeat. It’s also worth noting that abortion rights had a good election night. Ten states had ballot measures on abortion. Six of those states voted to expand abortion rights and none voted to restrict them. This means that there were many split-ticket voters who did vote to protect abortion rights and elect women, but didn’t vote for Kamala Harris.
Overall, Trump himself, and Republicans in general, over-performed the polls again. I thought the GOP would win in a landslide if they had nominated someone with more moderate appeal like Nikki Haley, so I’m less surprised that rank-and-file Republicans did well last night. (But they didn’t do quite as well as people seem to think.)
But I admit that I underestimated Trump’s campaign and the forces surrounding it. Specifically, I think I underestimated five things.
First, I underestimated how bad of a year this was to be an incumbent. With high inflation plaguing the rich world over the past few years, largely due to COVID, we were bound to have a change election. As John Burn-Murdoch pointed out, every single incumbent running for re-election nationally in 2024 in a major democracy has lost vote share.
Second, I underestimated the degree to which some voters’ experience in Trump’s first term blunted their fears about a second term. The economy was pretty strong until COVID hit; border crossings were low; and Trump didn’t wreck democracy like many pundits feared he would. Some conservative commentators like Ben Shapiro—who voted for Trump this time despite being previous Never-Trumpers—have outlined this argument.
Third, I underestimated Elon Musk. Love him or hate him, Musk is very effective at what he sets his mind to. He ended up not just endorsing Trump and donating a lot of money to his campaign, but also campaigning hard for him on the ground. I wouldn’t be surprised if Musk’s efforts, along with the last-minute endorsement from Joe Rogan, moved a few key votes in Trump’s favor.
Fourth, I underestimated the degree to which some voters still wanted to punish progressives and Democrats for their post-2020 cultural excesses—despite the recent progress against those excesses—even if that meant taking a gamble on Trump again. Bill Ackman’s X post outlining his decision to endorse Trump explains this line of thinking pretty well, agree with it or not. Josh Barro explains how Democrats’ poor governance in cities post 2020 makes it easy to understand why cities saw some of the biggest shifts to Trump, compared to 2020. A recent academic paper found that opposition to left-wing identity politics was the strongest predictor of support for Trump among white Americans—stronger than ideology, socioeconomic status, or racial prejudice.
I suspect the antisemitism—and the sometimes-pro-violence-and-pro-Hamas protests—in the streets and on college campuses over the past year provided a lot of fuel to the public’s desire to punish the far left. This certainly was the case for Ackman himself, who initially got involved in politics in response to the post-October-7 climate at Harvard and other elite universities. So, if people in the Ivory Tower are upset that Trump won, they should take a hard look in the mirror before lashing out at his voters. If your party loses vote share in virtually every demographic except people with graduate degrees and people making over $100,000 per year, you can’t claim to be speaking on behalf of ‘the little guy’ or ‘the oppressed’ in your outrage.
The Democrats, including Harris and Biden themselves, also deserve blame for flubbing the antisemitism issue. Consider the fact that Biden credited a single far-right antisemitic rally in Charlottesville as motivating him to run for President in 2020, to battle “for the soul of this nation”. And then, when there were dozens of antisemitic rallies—with Charlottesville-level rhetoric or worse—on college campuses and city streets almost every day for a year, in some cases celebrating the worst massacre of Jews since the Holocaust (October 7), Biden and Harris stayed mostly quiet. What about the soul of the nation?? Their lack of moral clarity on antisemitism lost them moral high ground, and it probably also made their supporters’ charge that Trump was a fascist or a Nazi ring hollow for some voters.
I have been predicting for months that the far left would be defeated as a major force in American politics before the far-right was. This election seems to vindicate that prediction, despite the fact that I was wrong about the election outcome. However, don’t expect the far left to be defeated quickly or smoothly. The far left did well under Trump the first time—able to draw strength from broad anxieties about his unpredictability and instances in which he took his policies farther than broad public opinion supported (e.g., family separations at the border). The far left will surely be organizing this time too (probably less successfully, though, regardless of what Trump does). It wouldn’t surprise me if the Trump administration takes some of their policies too far for the public this time, too.
Fifth, I underestimated Trump himself. I still agree with the descriptions of his movement as a cult of personality. But, you know what? It takes personality to lead a cult of personality. As off-putting and divisive as Trump’s comments and campaign speeches can be, he also has flashes of brilliance as an entertainer and intuitive politician. Examples include Trump’s shift working at McDonald’s (in response to a disputed Harris claim that she once worked there) and his appearance at a campaign rally in a garbage truck (in response to a Biden gaffe where he appeared to call Trump supporters ‘garbage’). His personal appeal to some voters must have at least something to do with his success in easily sweeping the Republican primaries (over other candidates, like Ron DeSantis, who would likely have been more disciplined in applying his policy agenda), and his ability to over-perform some Republicans in key down-ballot races this year (like in Michigan, Wisconsin, Nevada, and Arizona).
I am still optimistic about America and long-run polarization
I won’t rehash here in detail all of the reasons why I am still bullish on America, and why I am still optimistic about the long-term future of polarization, because I already laid those out in two long posts. I stand by the content of both posts.
Instead, I will highlight two positive trends about America—related to my areas of research on climate change and macroeconomics—that have been stable across the past Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. These trends illustrate that there are lots of things going right in America, many of which are beyond the reach of presidential cycles. They also highlight how left- and right-leaning policy tools can complement each other to create progress on key issues.
The American economy is strong and is pulling ahead of its peers. Since the early 1990s, the U.S. economy has been consistently stronger than its G7 peers, as shown below for gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and productivity. The relative strength of the U.S. economy has been so remarkable that The Economist published a whole special report on this phenomenon in October, called “The envy of the world”.
Why does the U.S. have such a strong economy? It turns out to be a combination of factors, some related to policy and others not.
We are endowed with a large land mass, access to both major oceans, and a large population of consumers, potential innovators, and workers, who have geographic mobility. Immigration has also been an engine of our world-leading innovation and economic growth, as we attract the best and brightest from all over the world. (Side note: one can both be in favor of high rates of legal immigration and opposed to high rates of illegal immigration. Indeed, this tends to be an overwhelmingly popular view among Americans. Trump himself has at times expressed support for more legal, skilled immigration.) The shale revolution—powered by both American geography and American innovation—has been a boon for our economy, energy security, and has even helped reduce our greenhouse gas emissions (by outcompeting coal in energy markets), though what role, if any, natural gas in future American progress on climate change is hotly debated.
Our economic success has many virtuous cycles. The fact that we have some of the richest financial markets in the world makes it easier for our companies to attract investment and pay the large capital costs many high-tech innovations require. The fact that we have some of the best companies in the world makes it is easier to attract capital to our financial markets. Because we attract the best and brightest immigrants, and we have some of the best companies and richest financial markets, it is easier for us to build the best universities in the world. Having the best companies and universities helps us create some of the best start-up ecosystems, and it helps us attract even more of the best and brightest minds. And so on.
(And yes, we really do still have the world’s best universities, despite the relatively small number of bad actors in some of them pushing politicization, antisemitism/bigotry/hatred, and anti-intellectualism. Once the rest of us on campus find our voices—which we owe it to our students and taxpayers to do, and which I think we increasingly will do after this election and the campus turmoil of the past year—these problems should get smaller much faster than people outside probably expect. Universities really still are vital to our economic and technological superiority. We shouldn’t take that for granted as we push for higher-ed reform.)
Policies—combining the best instincts from both sides of the aisle—can help too. Maintaining a fair process and attractive landscape for skilled immigration helps. Light regulations and low taxes can boost entrepreneurship, innovation, and housing supply, and it can attract talent. That said, our economy (and citizens’ well being) would also benefit from better and more equally accessible healthcare and K-12 education systems. The U.S. economy has been doing especially well compared to those of our peers since the pandemic. Both parties’ rescue packages, the Biden administration’s industrial policies, and the Federal Reserve’s management of interest rates, deserve some of the credit.
The Trump administration has promised some policies that economists expect could boost economic growth (like reducing regulations, corporate tax cuts, and promoting U.S. energy), and other policies that economists expect could reduce growth or worsen inflation (like tariffs and mass deportations). Project 2025 (which Trump has not endorsed) calls for major reforms to science and higher education. Some possible reforms could be beneficial to American science and by extension the American economy (like any reforms promoting academic freedom and institutional neutrality, and preventing political and identity-based discrimination). Others—like large cuts to funding—could be harmful.
Regardless of which of these policies the Trump administration chooses to pursue (and which of them Congress and the courts allow), he cannot in four years change the basic advantageous facts of America’s geography, financial markets, high human capital, and innovative spirit. If he succeeds in boosting economic growth, as he’s promised to try to do, the GOP will probably be rewarded for it in the next election. If he fails, they will probably be punished for it, and the Democrats will get another shot to advance their ideas. Either way, my expectation is that America’s long-run economic future is bright.
U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are decreasing and renewable energy investments are booming. The climate will survive the next four years. I wrote a long post about this on Friday, so I won’t lay out all of the details again here. But, in a nutshell, U.S. greenhouse gas emissions have been declining at a steady rate over the past three administrations, including the first Trump administration. The main reasons are: increasing renewable energy production, decreasing coal production (caused in large part by competition with natural gas), and increasing energy efficiency. All of these trends have strong market tailwinds behind them, and are supported by policies at the state and local levels.
The most important federal policies from the Biden administration were either bipartisan or are now popular enough with Republicans in Congress that they will likely survive the next Trump administration mostly intact. These policies also have boosted manufacturing and industrial re-shoring, especially in Republican Congressional districts, which are key objectives of Trump’s America First agenda. One of the key barriers slowing down clean technology is slow permitting, which Republican instincts to reduce regulation can help with (as this bipartisan bill illustrates). As with the economy, progress can come from Republicans and Democrats working together on combinations of their best ideas.
Go outside
Over the past decade, both Democrats and Republicans at various levels have suffered various electoral defeats. One of the most common themes in mistakes made by losing campaigns is listening to staffers who are too-online and consequently out-of-touch with the general public. You’d have to be too-online to think that promising to give a nine-year-old a veto on your Secretary of Education pick is a good idea (Elizabeth Warren in 2020), or to think that going to war with Mickey Mouse and Nazi memes were a good politics (Ron DeSantis in 2024, who fired the staffer responsible for the Nazi gaffe, which was reportedly made without DeSantis’ knowledge), or to think that this ad would resonate with men (from “Creatives for Harris”, not Harris’ official campaign) support.
Being too online (and/or watching too much cable news) exaggerates the polarization we are exposed to, compared to real public opinion. This may be a reason American partisans consistently overestimate how polarized we are and underestimate the moral and democratic characters of their political opponents. Being too online is also probably a contributor to the rise in youth anxiety and depression (though this is currently being debated). Contact, especially in a neutral setting with shared goals, is also one of the most proven ways to reduce inter-group animosity and polarization.
So, if you’re uneasy about the election results, or if you want to help reduce polarization, I have simple advice for you: Go outside! Talk to people. Join a community group. Volunteer in your kids’ school. Tend your garden (metaphorically or literally). Get some fresh air and exercise.
I keep thinking about how, the morning after the election, I played five-on-five adult basketball at our town’s recreation center, and then I saw a bunch of fellow parents when I dropped my kids off at their school. My county (Albany County, WY) is one of the purplest in the country (Trump won 51%-47%, nearly mirroring the national popular vote). So, there is probably an even mix of Trump and Harris voters among both groups I saw that morning. They’re are all good people whom I enjoy spending time with and whom I would trust my kids with.
On Friday, I moderated a dialogue among University of Wyoming’s faculty, staff, and students to debrief on the election. It was an insightful and civil discussion, where people shared a range of views, and the group clearly included supporters of each party (and probably a few supporters of neither party). Our student chapter of BridgeUSA (BridgeUWYO) is hosting a similar discussion for students this coming Wednesday, along with right- (Turning Point USA), left- (College Democrats), and libertarian-leaning (Students for Liberty) student groups. Our school got some positive press for this, highlighting our approach to election debriefing that emphasized dialogue, rather than offering students LEGO blocks, coloring books, aromatherapy, and therapy dogs (yes, really).
At one point during our dialogue on Friday, I asked the participants how many of them were friends with at least one person who voted differently from how they did. Almost everyone raised their hand. I was initially surprised, because if I had asked the same question at previous schools I’ve worked at (in Minnesota, California, and Colorado) there probably would have been many fewer hands raised. I had colleagues at each place who told me they kept their conservative or Christian views private out of fear of retaliation or ostracism at work.
The fact that UW and Laramie, WY are both politically diverse and close-knit communities is probably related to the fact that we have been able to process the election in a much more civil and cool-headed manner than most other schools have. Members of the UW and Laramie communities don’t need to be taught that American partisans have more in common than what divides us because we already know that.
So, to everyone unsatisfied with the election outcome (or with both choices), I would say the following: The more we can focus, as citizens (or permanent residents, in my case) on what unites us, the less patience we will have for the noises of division, and the more likely the major parties will be to offer us candidates who better reflect that in the future.